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The Dark Side of Codification
Thomas P. Gallanis*
The twentieth anniversary of the promulgation of the Uniform
Trust Code (UTC) is an occasion for celebration and reflection. The
time is right for celebration because the UTC is one of the successes of
the Uniform Law Commission (ULC). Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have enacted enough of the UTC to be counted by the
ULC as enacting jurisdictions.1 By comparison, the Uniform Probate
Code, parts of which have influenced virtually every state in the nation,2
has only eighteen enacting jurisdictions.3 The time also is right for re* Allan D. Vestal Chair in Law and Associate Dean for Research, University of
Iowa; Visiting Professor of Law (2017-2022), University of Chicago Law School; Visiting
Professor of Law (2019-2022), KoGuan Law School, Shanghai Jiao Tong University.
Many thanks to David English and Benjamin Orzeske for helpful comments.
Disclaimer: I serve as the executive director of the Uniform Law Commission’s Joint
Editorial Board for Uniform Trust and Estate Acts and have served as a reporter or coreporter for the Uniform Real Property Transfer on Death Act (2009), the Uniform Powers of Appointment Act (2013), and the 2019 Amendments to the Uniform Probate
Code. I have also served as an associate reporter for the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of Trusts. Nothing in this essay is intended to represent the views of the
Uniform Law Commission or the American Law Institute. I speak in my individual capacity only.
1 The enacting jurisdictions listed on the Uniform Law Commision’s website are
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, D.C., Florida, Illinois, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Trust Code, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, https://
www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=193ff839-79554846-8f3c-ce74ac23938d (last visited Nov. 2, 2019). The ULC does not have a fixed rule
for determining how much of the approved text of a uniform act must be enacted by a
state in order for the ULC to count that state as an enacting jurisdiction; it is a matter of
judgment. In exercising that judgment, the ULC is not disinterested; the ULC’s reputation and influence are enhanced by more enactments, and the ULC has an interest in
counting as many enacting jurisdictions as it reasonably can.
2 See Benjamin Orzeske & Thomas P. Gallanis, The Uniform Probate Code at 50,
33 PROB. & PROP., Sept./Oct. 2019, at 10.
3 The enacting jurisdictions listed on the ULC’s website are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
and Utah. Probate Code, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/
community-home?CommunityKey=a539920d-c477-44b8-84fe-b0d7b1a4cca8 (last visited
Nov. 2, 2019).
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flection. Prior to the UTC, the law of trusts in the U.S. was primarily
common law, albeit with specific uniform statutes such as the Uniform
Principal and Income Act (originally promulgated in 1931), the Uniform
Trustees’ Powers Act (1964), and the Uniform Prudent Investor Act
(1994).4 Has the UTC’s comprehensive codification of trust law been a
force for good or for ill? On balance, the UTC’s achievement is remarkable and generally a force for good. The harmonization, modernization,
and codification of trust law in so many U.S. states facilitates multi-jurisdictional trust activity and provides each enacting jurisdiction with a
comprehensive law of trusts, whereas previously only the questions of
trust law litigated in the state would have produced answers in the
state’s case law. But the promulgation of the UTC has not been an unqualified good. This essay offers a reminder that the codification of trust
law in the U.S. has a dark side.
The dark side of codification arises between promulgation and enactment. After the ULC promulgates a uniform act, the act is considered for enactment by the states. With respect to a uniform act in the
field of trusts and estates, the consideration typically begins in the section of the state bar association—or, in a major city, the committee of
the city bar association—concerned with estate planning. In Iowa, for
example, the state bar association has a Section on Probate, Trust, and
Estate Planning. In Illinois, the state bar association has a Section on
Trusts and Estates, and the Chicago Bar Association has a Trust Law
Committee. Nomenclature aside, the bar association’s section or committee plays a key role in determining whether and in what form a uniform act in the field of trusts and estates will become law. A bill in the
area of trusts and estates supported by the bar association is likely to be
approved by the legislature and signed by the governor. A uniform act
on trusts and estates—or a provision within the uniform act—opposed
by the bar association is unlikely to see the light of day. Also influential
are national or regional associations of corporate fiduciaries and bankers; examples include the American Bankers Association and the Corporate Fiduciaries Association of Illinois. Uniform acts in trusts and
estates rarely are enacted verbatim. More commonly, and especially
with large acts such as the UTC, the act is modified to a lesser or greater
degree by the enacting state. This often means it is modified during the
process of study by the bar and other associations, prior to the bill’s
introduction in the legislature. The modifications range from the helpful—for example, adjusting uniform provisions to conform to the particular state’s law or practice—to the pernicious.
4 For discussion, see John H. Langbein, Why Did Trust Law Become Statute Law in
the United States?, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1069, 1069-82 (2007).
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Pernicious modifications of the UTC have been enacted into law.
These arise not with respect to the default rules of trust law, which in
any event will yield to an expression of contrary intention in the terms
of the trust and which lawyers can alter or avoid by drafting, but with
respect to the mandatory rules of trust law, which purposefully disregard
a contrary provision in the terms of the trust in order to achieve overriding goals of policy.5 For example, the official text of the UTC follows the
common law in providing that a settlor may not eliminate the trustee’s
duty to provide some information about an irrevocable trust to some of
the trust’s beneficiaries.6 The reason for this rule is straightforward: the
trustee has a mandatory duty to provide information to at least some of
the beneficiaries because only the beneficiaries have both the legal authority and the economic incentive to monitor and enforce the trustee’s
performance.7 Yet of the thirty-five jurisdictions enacting the UTC, seventeen have eliminated this mandatory rule,8 and many others have
weakened it.9 Another example concerns the fundamental requirement
that a trust and its terms be for the benefit of the beneficiaries.10 The
5 For a discussion of the mandatory rules, see John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules
in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105, 1105-28 (2004).
6 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(8) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000, amended 2004)
(“the duty . . . to notify qualified beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust who have attained
25 years of age of the existence of the trust, of the identity of the trustee, and of their
right to request trustee’s reports”); see also id. § 105(b)(9) (“the duty . . . to respond to
the request of a [qualified] beneficiary of an irrevocable trust for trustee’s reports and
other information reasonably related to the administration of the trust”). In 2004, these
provisions were placed in brackets to indicate that uniformity no longer was expected.
See id. § 105 cmt. On the common law, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (“Although the terms of the trust may regulate the amount
of information which the trustee must give and the frequency with which it must be given,
the beneficiary is always entitled to such information as is reasonably necessary to enable
him to enforce his rights under the trust or to prevent or redress a breach of trust.”).
7 For discussion, see Thomas P. Gallanis, The Trustee’s Duty to Inform, 85 N.C. L.
REV. 1595, 1621 (2007).
8 ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-105(b) (2019); H.B. 1471, 101st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.
Sess. § 105(b) (Ill. 2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-105(b) (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
203E, § 105(b) (2019); MINN. STAT. § 501C.0105(b) (2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-38105(2) (2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:1-105(b) (2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-1105(b) (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-09-05(2) (2019); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-105(b)
(2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-105(b) (2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-105(2) (LexisNexis 2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 105(b) (2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-703(B)
(2019); W. VA. CODE § 44D-1-105(b) (2019); WIS. STAT. § 701.0105(2) (2019); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 4-10-105(b) (2019).
9 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 19-1301.05(c) (2019); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 386B.1030(2)(h), 386B.8-130(2) (West 2019); ME. STAT. tit. 18-B § 105(3) (2019); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 91-8-105(d) (2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 46A-8-813(F) (2019); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5801.04(C) (LexisNexis 2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 130.020(3) (2019).
10 For a disagreement about whether the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule should be
mandatory, compare Jeffrey A. Cooper, Empty Promises: Settlor’s Intent, the Uniform
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official text of the UTC follows the common law in framing the requirement as mandatory.11 Yet eight of the jurisdictions enacting the UTC
have deleted this provision,12 and two have weakened it.13 The process
of codifying trust law created the opportunity to capture the legislative
process and eliminate or weaken these as mandatory rules.
Uniform acts are more prone to interest-group capture than the
Restatements of the Law produced by the American Law Institute
(ALI) because uniform laws need to be enacted by a state legislature. In
many respects, the organizations producing uniform acts and Restatements are similar: the ULC and the ALI are dedicated to stating and
improving the law, and both consist of lawyers, judges, and professors.
The ALI is explicit that “members should speak, write, and vote on the
basis of their personal and professional convictions and experience without regard to client interests or self-interest;”14 similarly, the ULC is
explicit that commissioners “are expected to leave personal and client
interests at the door . . . [and to] exercise their judgment . . . without
regard to self-interest or client interest.”15 At plenary meetings of each
organization, the ALI members and the ULC commissioners endorsed
the mandatory rules described above. But the uniform-law process does
not end when a uniform act is promulgated; the uniform act remains to
be considered by each state. The bar associations and other associations
exert substantial influence over whether and in what form the act may
be enacted by the state legislature, and the legislative process is subject
to capture from these and other interest groups. The phenomenon is not
Trust Code, and the Future of Trust Investment Law, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1165 (2008) (criticizing the rule), with John H. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt?: Trust Law’s Limits on the
Settlor’s Power to Direct Investments, 90 B.U. L. REV. 375 (2010) (defending the rule).
11 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(3) (“the requirement that a trust and its terms
be for the benefit of its beneficiaries”). The benefit-the-beneficiaries rule expresses the
rationale of the longstanding mandatory rule against capricious purposes. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 62 cmt. w (“if a house is devised with a direction to block it
up for twenty years, or if money is bequeathed with a direction to throw it into the sea,
the direction is against public policy”).
12 H.B. 7104, Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. § 5(b)(3) (Conn. 2019); FLA. STAT.
§ 736.0105(2)(c) (2019); H.B. 1471, 101st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 105(b)(3) (Ill.
2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 203E, § 105(b)(3); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7105(2)(c)
(2019); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7705(b)(3), 7734 (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5801.04(B)(3); W.VA. CODE § 44D-1-105(b)(3).
13 MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-8-105(b)(3); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-105(b)(3) (both
providing for “the requirement that a trust and its terms be for the benefit of the beneficiaries as the interests of such beneficiaries are defined under the terms of the trust
. . . .”).
14 Procedures, AM. LAW INST., https://www.ali.org/annual-meeting-2019/procedures/
(citing RULES OF THE COUNCIL r. 4.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2007)).
15 Conflict of Interest Policy, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/about
ulc/policies/conflictofinterestpolicy (last updated Dec. 6, 2018).
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unique to the UTC nor to uniform laws. The statutes in U.S. states authorizing self-settled asset protection trusts16 and repealing or eviscerating the Rule Against Perpetuities also are examples.17
The UTC was and is a great achievement—but on this twentieth
anniversary, we must be clear-sighted not only about the benefits but
also about the harms. Codification has a dark side.

16 In most of the UTC states that also authorize the self-settled asset protection
trust (APT), the APT legislation was enacted years after the state’s enactment of the
UTC.
17 For a recent critique of such statutes, see Lionel Smith, Give the People What
They Want? The Onshoring of the Offshore, 103 IOWA L. REV. 2155, 2155-74 (2018).

